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Visual appearance of the virtual 
hand affects embodiment in the 
virtual hand illusion
Maria pyasik  1*, Gaetano tieri2,3 & Lorenzo pia  1,4
Body ownership (the feeling that one’s body belongs to oneself) is commonly studied with Rubber hand 
illusion (RHI) paradigm that allows inducing a temporary illusory feeling of ownership of a life-sized 
rubber hand. However, it remains unclear whether illusory ownership of the fake hand relies on the 
same mechanisms as ownership of one’s own real hand. Here, we directly compared ownership of the 
own hand (OH) and fake hand (FH) in the same set of conditions within immersive virtual reality. We 
obtained behavioral (proprioceptive drift) and subjective (questionnaire) measures of ownership and 
disownership for virtual OH, FH and object (Obj) that were located congruently or incongruently with 
the participant’s real hand and were stimulated synchronously or asynchronously with the real hand. 
Both OH and FH (but not Obj) were embodied after synchronous stimulation in both locations. Crucially, 
subjective ownership of the OH was stronger than of the FH in congruent location after synchronous 
stimulation. It was also present after asynchronous stimulation, being stronger when the virtual OH was 
subjectively more similar to the real hand. The results suggest that the detailed appearance of the body 
might act as an additional component in the construction of body ownership.
The experience that one’s own body belongs to oneself, i.e. body ownership1, is one of the crucial components of 
human self-awareness, and it is constant, omnipresent and largely unconscious2.
Body ownership can be investigated either in neurologically-based disorders of body representation, e.g.,3–8, 
or in healthy participants by using a paradigm called Rubber hand illusion (RHI9). During the RHI procedure, 
a life-sized rubber hand is placed in front of the participant congruently with the participant’s body (i.e., in 
first-person perspective), while the corresponding real hand is hidden from the view. The rubber and the real 
hands are touched synchronously in space and time (e.g., stroked by paintbrushes), which typically evokes a 
vivid illusory sensation that the fake hand became a part of participant’s own body. Furthermore, embodiment 
of the rubber hand is additionally characterized by the feeling of disownership/disembodiment of the corre-
sponding own hand, i.e., the feeling that one’s own hand disappeared when the rubber hand was embodied10,11. 
The illusory experience is quantified at subjective (questionnaire answers), behavioral (proprioceptive drift, i.e. 
the perceived mislocalization of one’s own hand towards the fake hand) and physiological level (e.g., skin con-
ductance response12,13 and hand temperature14). Overall, stronger embodiment illusion over the fake hand is 
therefore characterized by higher ownership and disownership ratings, larger proprioceptive drift and decrease 
in the own-hand temperature.
The RHI effects are explained by the fact that when the incoming visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals are 
temporally congruent (synchronous stimulation), the conflict between vision of the fake hand and tactile and 
proprioceptive sensation from one’s own hand is resolved in favor of vision15–17. The explanation is consistent with 
a well-known neurocognitive model of body ownership during the RHI17. The model states that body ownership 
is constructed at a series of hierarchical stages where incoming sensory signals that constantly reach the body are 
compared with preexisting internal body representations. At the end, a full and coherent ownership of a fake hand 
is constructed. Importantly, when the fake hand is embodied, its representation could partially replace the rep-
resentation of the real hand, instead of simply becoming an additional, third, limb (e.g.,14; although some studies 
demonstrated illusory ownership of supernumerary limbs, e.g.,18).
Since the first time it was described, the RHI paradigm has been adapted for different technologies, such 
as robotic devices or virtual reality, resulting in Robot hand illusion19–22, Virtual hand-23–26 and Virtual body 
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illusion27,28. Importantly, differently from the classical RHI setup where the fake hand is usually placed near the 
real hand, in a virtual reality setup, the virtual hand can be placed in the same position as the real one, giving the 
experimental advantage of the congruence in visuo-proprioceptive information. Indeed, recent studies demon-
strated that, in a VR setup, the simple passive observation of a virtual limb (without visuo-tactile stimulation) 
is a sufficient condition for eliciting illusory ownership over the virtual limb itself24,25,28–31. Furthermore, such 
enhanced role of visual information from the virtual scene can provide ample opportunities for experimental 
manipulations of body ownership by maintaining the visuo-proprioceptive information constant. For example, 
it allows creating a mismatch between the movements performed by the virtual and the real body, which the 
participant remains unaware of32,33.
The multitude of RHI studies draw conclusions about body ownership from an artificial experimental situa-
tion of illusory ownership of a fake/virtual hand/body. In contrast, some studies manipulated participants’ own 
hand in RHI-like setups. For instance, Projected hand illusion34,35 uses the videos of participant’s own hand that 
are projected on a table in front of them, either in live timing, or with a delay (which creates asynchronous stimu-
lation). In more immersive setups, such as the MIRAGE system, the videos of the own hand are projected on the 
same plane as the real hand18, or presented in a head-mounted display (HMD)36,37. Moreover, other variations of 
the experimental procedure used augmented-38 and mixed reality10. Such manipulations of the own hand allow 
not only evaluating the sense of ownership, but also the sense of disownership of one’s own hand across various 
conditions of multisensory conflict, which usually involve the dissociation between vision and touch in terms 
of timing or location, as well as between the seen and perceived hand position. Indeed, when incongruent (e.g., 
temporally or spatially asynchronous) stimulation was applied to the participant’s own hand, they experienced 
disownership of their hand that was represented by subjective, physiological and neural measures10,36. As for the 
sense of ownership, the conclusions of these studies were largely similar to the studies with the fake hand/body, 
such as the importance of multisensory integration in the construction of body ownership.
So far, however, no study has compared ownership/disownership of one’s own vs other hand in an identical 
complete set of conditions that would include different locations of the seen hand with respect to the real hand, 
and different types of stimulation. Therefore, a clear comprehension of the role played by visual information in 
eliciting ownership over a fake hand is still lacking.
To fill in this gap, here, we integrated 3d-scans of participant’s own hand within a setup in immersive vir-
tual reality (IVR) and manipulated the appearance of the virtual hand [own hand (OH), fake hand (FH) and 
a hand-sized object resembling a plain wooden block (Obj25) as a control condition], its location [congruent 
(Congr) or incongruent (Incongr) with the participant’s real hand] and type of visuotactile stimulation [synchro-
nous (Syn) or asynchronous (Asyn)]. We then performed a RHI-like procedure in each condition and registered 
behavioral (proprioceptive drift) and subjective (questionnaire) measures of ownership of the virtual hand and 
disownership of the own hand.
We hypothesized that the illusory effects would be the strongest in the conditions with the highest congruence 
of multisensory information (vision, touch, proprioception, hand position and appearance) and would decrease 
with every degree of incongruence. By systematically varying the three factors described above (hand appearance, 
visuotactile stimulation and hand location), we therefore expected to identify, which of the factors played a more 
important part in constructing the feeling of ownership. We predicted that, firstly, subjective ownership of the 
virtual FH would be present only in Syn stimulation conditions (both in Congr and Incongr location), as in the 
typical RHI. Secondly, compared to the FH, ownership of the OH would be stronger after Syn stimulation, espe-
cially in the Congr location, but it also might be present, to some extent, in the conditions of Asyn stimulation in 
both locations. Thirdly, the proprioceptive drift would be present only in the conditions with Incongr location of 
OH or FH after Syn stimulation. As for the subjective disownership of the real hand, we expected to find some 
degree of disownership of the own hand in the FH conditions after Syn, but not Asyn stimulation, both in Congr 
and Incongr location. In turn, for the OH, disownership might be stronger in the conditions of Asyn stimulation 
and Incongr location. Finally, none of the conditions that include virtual Obj should induce neither subjective 
ownership/disownership, nor the proprioceptive drift.
Methods
Participants. Forty-five right-handed39 healthy participants (32 females, 13 males, mean 
age ± SD = 22.96 ± 2.48) with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and no history of neurological or 
psychiatric disease took part in the study. All participants were naïve to the experimental procedure and to the 
purpose of the study and provided written informed consent to participate in the study. The study was approved 
by the Bioethical Committee of the University of Turin and was carried out in accordance with the ethical stand-
ards of the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental design. The experiment included the VHI procedure that was modified across twelve exper-
imental conditions in a within-subject design: 3 × 2 × 2, i.e., Type of virtual object [own hand (OH), fake hand 
(FH), object (Obj)] x Location [congruent (Congr) with the participant’s real hand or incongruent (Incongr), 
shifted 20 cm towards the body midline] x Visuo-Tactile Stimulation [synchronous (Syn) or asynchronous 
(Asyn)] (see Fig. 1A, right panel). The experiment was conducted in a single session that lasted approximately 
two hours.
Stimuli. Before the experiment, we obtained 3D-scans of each participant’s right hand using a 3D scanner 
(Sense 3D Scanner, 3D Systems, Inc.); during the 3D-scanning, the participant’s hand was placed on a tabletop 
in a relaxed position. The scans were preprocessed with Sense software (3D Systems, Inc.) and 3DS Max 2015 
(Autodesk, Inc.) and implemented in the virtual setup (see details below). The individual 3D-scan of participant’s 
hand was used for the OH conditions, while for the FH conditions, a gender-matched 3D scan of another person’s 
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hand was used. In order to make the FH look more artificial, we increased the smoothness of the 3D scan by 50% 
and changed the color making it whiter than a human hand (RGB: 255; 212; 208). As a control condition, a virtual 
object (Obj), resembling a plain wooden block with the same dimensions as FH and OH, was designed in 3DS 
Max 2015 (Autodesk, Inc.) and implemented in the virtual scenario (see Fig. 1A, right panel). In accordance with 
previous evidence that the RHI susceptibility was not related to the hand laterality40–42, during the experiment we 
tested only the dominant (right) hand.
Setup. The virtual scenario was designed using 3DS Max 2015 (Autodesk, Inc.) and implemented in Unity 5 
game software environment (http://unity.com). It was presented by means of Oculus Rift head-mounted display 
(HMD, www.oculus.com) with a 110° field-of-view (diagonal FOV) and a resolution of 2160 × 1200. The virtual 
scenario included a dark room with a table (90 × 60 cm, scale 1:1) having the same dimensions and color as 
the real table in the laboratory where the experiment took place. A virtual hand/object was positioned on the 
table and a virtual black cloth covered the distance between the hand’s wrist/the near edge of the object and the 
approximate location of the participant’s neck (as in the RHI, e.g.9). In order to deliver the vibrotactile stimulation 
on participant’s hand, a small round stimulator was attached to the back of participant’s right palm; during the 
experimental conditions, it was triggered by an Arduino microcontroller (https://www.arduino.cc) by means of a 
customized script implemented in Unity.
Procedure. Experimental setup and procedure are presented in Fig. 1. Written informed consent has been given 
by the person shown in the images to publish these in this online open-access publication.
After the virtual scene was adjusted for the participant, i.e., the 3D-scan of his/her hand was integrated in 
the scene, the participant was asked to sit in front of the table and put on the HMD. Participant’s right hand was 
placed on a fixed spot on the table (30 cm to the right from the middle of the table and the participant’s body mid-
line). Then, participant was asked to sit comfortably and keep the hand relaxed and still during all experimental 
conditions.
Before the beginning of the experimental phase, the participants observed the virtual scene with the 3D-scan 
of their own hand located on the virtual table in the same spot where their real hand was. Since the experiment 
aimed at comparing ownership of the OH vs FH, it was crucial that the participants recognized their hand in 
the 3D image. Thus, they were asked to evaluate the similarity of the 3D image to their real hand, along with the 
plausibility of the virtual-hand’s location, and to rate the level of similarity on a 0–7 Likert scale (0 = absence 
of similarity and 7 = full correspondence to the appearance their real hand). Before the beginning of the data 
collection, we established that participants who rated the similarity of the virtual hand as less than 5/7 would 
Figure 1. Experimental setup and procedure: (A) setup; the left panel shows the participant wearing the HMD, 
right panel shows the participant’s view of the virtual scene in different conditions – Own hand (top row), 
Fake hand (middle row), Object (bottom row), and the list of experimental conditions; (B) timeline of a single 
condition.
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not continue with the experimental tasks. None of the participants were excluded (the ratings of the virtual OH 
similarity ranged from 5 to 7, mean ± SD = 5.81 ± 0.68).
All experimental conditions had an identical experimental procedure that included: (i) pre-stimulation pro-
prioceptive judgments, (ii) stimulation phase, (iii) post-stimulation proprioceptive judgments and (iv) question-
naire about the sense of ownership and disownership (see Fig. 1B). In turn, the conditions differed in three 
factors: (1) Type of virtual object: OH, FH and Obj; (2) Location: each of these objects was located either congru-
ently with the participant’s real hand (i.e., the object’s position on the virtual table fully corresponded with the 
location of the real hand), or incongruently (i.e., the object was shifted 20 cm to the left, towards the middle of the 
virtual and real table and towards the participant’s body midline); (3) Visuotactile stimulation: for each type of 
object in each location, there were two types of visuotactile stimulation – Syn and Asyn. During the stimulation 
phase, a virtual ball appeared in the virtual scenario and moved up and down (according to a preprogrammed 
animation), touching the virtual object in the location that corresponded with the location of the vibrotactile 
stimulator on the participant’s hand (see Fig. 1A) (frequency and duration of each touch were 0.27 Hz and 500 ms, 
respectively). In Syn stimulation conditions, the stimulator on the participant’s hand vibrated at the moment 
when the virtual ball touched the object. In Asyn stimulation conditions, the same vibrotactile stimulation was 
delivered in the phase opposite to the ball’s touch, i.e., when the ball was up in the air.
In each condition, firstly, the virtual scene was obscured and the participants saw only a white horizontal line 
with a green cursor on a black background. The line was 100 cm long, therefore slightly exceeding the length of 
the real and the virtual table. The participants were asked to move the cursor along that line (using left and right 
arrow buttons with their left hand) so that it would point to the perceived position of their real right middle 
finger. This procedure was repeated for six trials; in the beginning of every trial, the cursor appeared at a ran-
dom position on the line. The actual location of the participant’s middle finger was then subtracted from the 
subjective responses (i.e., the registered location of the cursor) and the resulting differences were referred to as 
pre-stimulation proprioceptive judgments.
Then, the white horizontal line and the cursor were replaced by the virtual scene. The participants were 
instructed to pay attention the scene and remain still. The scene included the stimulation phase (60 s). After the 
stimulation phase, the virtual scene was obscured again and the white line with the cursor appeared. As in the 
pre-stimulation proprioceptive judgments, the participants had to move the cursor to indicate the perceived 
location of their right middle finger (6 trials). The differences between actual and perceived location of the finger 
were referred to as post-stimulation proprioceptive judgments.
Post-stimulation proprioceptive judgments were followed by the ownership and disownership questionnaire. 
Each statement of the questionnaire was presented separately on the black background; below the statement, the 
participants saw a visual analogue scale (VAS) with the cursor placed in the middle and the ends marked with 
“−” (left side) and “+” (right side). The participants were told that the statements refer to the last scene that they 
saw (in order to avoid confusion between the conditions). They were then asked to read each statement carefully 
and express the level of agreement or disagreement by moving the cursor along the VAS; the middle of the scale 
represented uncertainty, the left end – complete disagreement and the right end – complete agreement. As soon as 
the participants responded to the presented statement, it was replaced with the next one. The recorded responses 
represented the cursor position on the VAS, with the scale ranging from −50 to 50. The questionnaire contained 
nine statements – three Ownership statements (describing different aspects of the feeling of ownership of the 
virtual hand/object), three disownership statements (describing different aspects of the feeling of disownership 
of one’s own hand) and three Control statements (included for controlling participant’s compliance with the 
instructions and suggestibility effects). The statements were selected from previous studies25,36,43 and modified in 
order to be suitable for all conditions (see Table 1). The order of the statements was randomized in each condition.
The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants according to a Latin Square. Between the 
conditions, participants were asked to lift their right hand from the table and move it in order to avoid possible 
aftereffects of the previous conditions. Prior to beginning each condition, the experimenter placed the partic-
ipant’s hand back on the marked spot on the table and asked the participant to keep the hand relaxed and still 
throughout the following task.
Data handling. Questionnaire. We calculated the general Ownership, Control and Disownership scores 
by averaging the scores in (Q1–Q3), (Q4–Q6) and (Q7–Q9), respectively. We then compared Ownership and 
Control scores within each condition, and Ownership scores between Syn and Asyn stimulation within each 
condition. Furthermore, we compared the ownership scores between different types of virtual object and location 
Ownership
Q1. I felt as if I was looking at my own hand
Q2. I felt as if the Virtual Hand/Virtual Object was part of my body
Q3. It felt as if the touch I experienced was directly caused by the ball 
that was touching the virtual hand/object
Control
Q4. It felt as if I had more than one right hand
Q5. I felt as if my real hand was turning virtual
Q6. It felt as if the touch I experienced came from somewhere 
between my own hand and the virtual hand/object
Disownership
Q7. It seemed as if my hand had disappeared
Q8. It seemed as if I could not really tell where my hand was
Q9. It seemed as if I was unable to move my hand
Table 1. Ownership and disownership questionnaire.
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with Syn stimulation conditions. We did not perform an identical analysis for Asyn stimulation, since the prelim-
inary analysis showed that the ownership ratings were negative in all Asyn conditions.
Then, in order to obtain a more detailed pattern of differences between conditions, we analyzed separate 
ownership statements (Q1–Q3), since they represent different aspects of ownership11. We followed the same 
logic, i.e., firstly, we compared the scores between Syn and Asyn stimulation within each condition, then between 
conditions with Syn stimulation (as for the averaged ownership ratings, the Asyn stimulation conditions were not 
analyzed in detail due to the negative ratings in the majority of conditions).
We followed a similar logic in analyzing Disownership statements, i.e., performed the initial comparisons 
between Syn and Asyn stimulation in each condition and then compared the ratings between different types of 
virtual object and location with Syn stimulation conditions.
As for Control statements, since the preliminary analysis showed that the scores in all conditions were nega-
tive, we did not perform any detailed analyses.
Proprioceptive drift. In each condition, pre-proprioceptive judgments were subtracted post-stimulation propri-
oceptive judgments, and the resulting differences were averaged between the six trials. This value was referred to 
as proprioceptive drift35. It was measured in cm; positive values represented the perceived shift of the participant’s 
hand to the left, i.e., towards the body midline and towards the virtual object in the conditions with the incongru-
ent location. Negative values, therefore, represented the perceived shift of the hand away from the body midline. 
The proprioceptive drift was firstly compared between Syn and Asyn condition separately for each type of virtual 
object and each location. Then, we compared the drift between all conditions with Syn stimulation and between 
all conditions with Asyn stimulation, separately for Congr and Incongr location.
Correlations. We calculated correlations between the subjective ratings of OH similarity (reported prior to the 
experiment, as described above) and the proprioceptive drift and ownership ratings.
Since at least one variable in each analysis violated the criteria for normality of distribution on a Shapiro–Wilk 
test (p > 0.05), nonparametric analyses were performed. The effect sizes were estimated with correlation coeffi-
cient effect size r. Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was performed for adjusting the alpha level for 
statistical significance according to the number of comparisons in each analysis.
Results
Due to the large number of performed analyses and generated results, below we present their summary. Detailed 
results and descriptive statistics can be found in Supplementary Materials.
Subjective reports on ownership. Averaged Ownership and Control ratings are presented in Fig. 2. 
The comparisons between Ownership and Control scores within each condition showed significantly higher 
Ownership ratings in all OH conditions (both locations and types of stimulation) and FH with Syn stimulation 
(also in both locations), but not for FH with Asyn stimulation or Obj. As for the comparison of ownership ratings 
between Syn and Asyn stimulation conditions for each type of object, they were significantly higher after Syn 
stimulation compared to Asyn stimulation in every condition. Within the Syn stimulation conditions, compa-
rable ownership was observed for OH and FH both in Congr and Incongr location (Congr: p = 0.016 [N.S. after 
Bonferroni correction; alpha level: p = 0.006]; Incongr: p = 0.56). In turn, both OH and FH had significantly 
higher ownership ratings then Obj in both locations (Congr location, OH: p < 0.0001, r = 0.48, FH: p < 0.0001, 
r = 0.38; Incongr location, OH: p < 0.0001, r = 0.68; FH: p < 0.0001, r = 0.65). Neither OH, nor FH ratings dif-
fered between Congr and Incongr location, while for Obj, the ratings in Congr location were significantly higher 
compared to Incongr. Crucially, the ownership ratings were positive only for OH and FH with Syn stimula-
tion, both Congr and Incongr location. Negative ratings in other conditions suggest the absence of subjective 
ownership.
In order to obtain more detailed results on ownership, we analyzed the three Ownership statements separately 
(see Fig. 3). In Q1 (“I felt as if I was looking at my own hand”), the ratings in Syn stimulation were significantly 
Figure 2. Questionnaire scores (ownership and control; −50/+50): (A) Congr Location; (B) Incongr Location. 
The box represents the first and the third quartile with the line in the middle of the box representing the median, 
and the bottom and top whiskers represent the first quartile minus 1.5*IQR and the third quartile plus 1.5*IQR.
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higher than in Asyn in all conditions, except for Obj Incongr. Further comparisons within the Syn stimulation 
conditions showed that the ratings were the highest for OH Congr compared to FH Congr and Obj Congr (OH 
vs FH: p < 0.0001, r = 0.58; OH vs Obj: p < 0.0001, r = 0.16), while for Incongr location OH and FH were com-
parable (p = 0.03 [N.S. after Bonferroni correction; alpha level: p = 0.006]) and significantly higher than Obj 
(p < 0.0001, r = 0.04). Importantly, they were positive only in all OH conditions (regardless of location and stim-
ulation type) and FH Syn (in both locations).
In Q2 (“I felt as if the Virtual Hand/Virtual Object was part of my body”), similarly to Q1, the ratings were sig-
nificantly higher in Syn stimulation than in Asyn in all conditions, except for Obj Incongr. Within the Syn stim-
ulation conditions, OH and FH did not differ significantly in both locations (Congr: p = 0.99; Incongr: p = 0.79), 
and their ratings were positive and significantly higher compared to the Obj, which had negative ratings; the 
ratings were also positive in both OH Asyn conditions.
In Q3 (“It felt as if the touch I experienced was directly caused by the ball that was touching the virtual hand/
object”), a similar pattern was observed in all conditions: the ratings after Syn stimulation were significantly 
higher than after Asyn stimulation in all conditions.). In Syn Congr conditions, the ratings for the three types of 
virtual object were not different, and in Syn Incongr conditions, OH and FH did not differ between each other 
but had significantly higher ratings than Obj. Within each type of virtual object, Congr condition did not differ 
significantly from Incongr condition. The ratings were positive in all Syn conditions and negative in all Asyn 
conditions.
Proprioceptive drift. According to the Wilcoxon signed rank test, proprioceptive drift was not significantly 
different between Syn and Asyn stimulation in any of the conditions; see Fig. 4. Furthermore, it was significantly 
higher for OH than for Obj in Incongr Syn condition (p = 0.001, r = 0.20), while no significant differences were 
present for Congr conditions.
It is also necessary to note that in all Congr conditions, the proprioceptive drift was negative, i.e., the perceived 
position of participant’s own hand shifted away from the body midline. On the contrary, in all Incongr conditions, 
it was positive, which suggests the perceived shift of participant’s hand towards the incongruently located virtual 
object and the body midline.
Subjective reports on disownership. The ratings in disownership questions (averaged Q7-Q9) were neg-
ative in all conditions (see Fig. 5), which suggests that the participants did not experience disownership of their 
Figure 3. Ownership questionnaire scores (−50/+50): (A) Q1 (“I felt as if I was looking at my own hand”); (B) 
Q2 (“I felt as if the Virtual Hand/Virtual Object was part of my body”); (C) Q3 (“It felt as if the touch I experienced 
was directly caused by the ball that was touching the virtual hand/object). The box represents the first and the 
third quartile with the line in the middle of the box representing the median, and the bottom and top whiskers 
represent the first quartile minus 1.5*IQR and the third quartile plus 1.5*IQR.
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own hand in any of the conditions. However, they were relatively higher for OH and FH conditions, especially in 
Incongr location, regardless of the stimulation type.
Correlations. We calculated Spearman rank order correlations between the subjective ratings of virtual OH 
similarity to participant’s own real hand and the proprioceptive drift and ownership ratings, represented both by 
the averaged ownership ratings (Q1-Q3) and by the three statements separately. The only significant positive cor-
relation was observed between the subjective OH similarity and the ratings in ownership Q2 in OH Congr Asyn 
condition (ρ = 0.45, p = 0.002). No significant correlations were present in other conditions either for the ques-
tionnaire, or for the drift. Therefore, stronger embodiment of the virtual OH after Asyn stimulation was observed 
in the participants that were more ready to recognize their own hand in its 3D scan prior to the experimental task.
Discussion
In the present study, we experimentally manipulated various aspects of the sense of body ownership across a set 
of conditions. In a VHI procedure within IVR, we varied the type of presented virtual object (OH, FH, Obj), its 
location (Congr with the location of participant’s real hand or Incongr, i.e., shifted 20 cm towards the participant’s 
body midline) and type of visuotactile stimulation (Syn or Asyn). In each condition, we measured the propri-
oceptive drift and subjective experience of ownership and disownership via a questionnaire, and compared the 
obtained measures between the conditions.
Firstly, in the ownership questionnaire, the mean ownership ratings were significantly higher than those in 
the control questions in all OH conditions (regardless of the location and type of stimulation) and in FH Syn 
conditions (both Congr and Incongr location), but not in FH Asyn. Therefore, in case of the subjective experience 
of ownership, the typical RHI pattern was replicated for the FH (i.e., the basic RHI-like condition) and the OH; 
for the OH, it was also present after Asyn stimulation, which is usually considered as a control condition. The Obj 
conditions proved to be the appropriate control, because the ownership ratings were negative in any location and 
stimulation type.
Furthermore, we analyzed the three ownership statements separately because each of them represented dif-
ferent aspects of ownership11. Specifically, Q1 (“I felt as if I was looking at my own hand”) and Q2 (“I felt as if the 
Virtual Hand/Virtual Object was part of my body”) are both considered to represent the experience of ownership, 
but Q1 might be more related to the component of appearance, while Q2 might focus more on the experience of 
embodiment per se. Finally, Q3 (“It felt as if the touch I experienced was directly caused by the ball that was touch-
ing the virtual hand/object”) represents the location component in the experience of ownership, i.e., the feeling 
that the observed stimulation of the virtual hand/object caused, or corresponded to, the tactile sensation on the 
real hand. The results showed that, in Q1, in Congr location, the ratings for OH were significantly higher than 
Figure 4. Proprioceptive drift (mean ± SEMs, cm).
Figure 5. Disownership questionnaire scores (−50/+50). The box represents the first and the third quartile 
with the line in the middle of the box representing the median, and the bottom and top whiskers represent the 
first quartile minus 1.5*IQR and the third quartile plus 1.5*IQR.
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for FH and Obj, while in Incongr location, OH and FH were comparable and higher than Obj; moreover, the 
ratings were positive (representing agreement with the statement) in all OH conditions, both Syn and Asyn, and 
FH Syn conditions, regardless of the location. In Q2, OH and FH had comparable positive ratings in Syn condi-
tions, which were significantly higher than for Obj; the ratings were also positive in OH Asyn conditions. In Q3, 
which represented location, a similar pattern was observed across all types of virtual objects in both locations, 
i.e., positive ratings in Syn condition and negative ratings in Asyn, with Syn being significantly higher; in Congr 
location, there were no significant differences between OH, FH and Obj, while in Incongr location, OH and FH 
were rated significantly higher than Obj. In summary, during Syn stimulation, the subjective feeling of ownership 
was stronger for the OH compared to the FH in the aspect of direct recognition of the seen hand (Q1), but similar 
to the FH in the aspect of embodiment (Q2). Interestingly, while the ratings for the FH followed the typical RHI 
results in form of negative ratings in the Asyn condition, it was not the case for the OH. Even though the ratings 
in Q1 and Q2 for the OH after Asyn stimulation were lower than after Syn stimulation, they were still positive. 
In turn, the location component (Q3) does not directly represent ownership, but rather the recognition of spatial 
and temporal congruency between the seen and the felt touches during the stimulation, which explains similar 
results for OH, FH and Obj.
Altogether, results of the ownership questionnaire confirm that embodiment of the FH is primarily driven by 
the integration of synchronous visuotactile information in case when the seen object is anatomically plausible (in 
accordance with15,17,44–49). However, the comparison between FH and OH, as well as the positive ratings in Q1 and 
Q2 for OH after Asyn stimulation, showed that the appearance of the hand was also relevant, to some extent. The 
possible role of hand appearance was previously discussed in a study by Ratcliffe & Newport50 that manipulated 
ownership of participant’s own hand and showed that multisensory integration was not sufficient for creating 
the feeling of ownership when the image of the own hand was distorted and misplaced. In addition, it has been 
shown that ownership of the own hand and the fake hand differed in terms of neural activity: for the own hand, 
compared to the fake hand, stronger activation of ventromedial prefrontal cortex and lateral occipitotemporal 
cortex, and weaker activation of the temporoparietal and ventral premotor cortices was observed51. Contrary to 
our findings, other studies did not show ownership of the own hand after asynchronous stimulation, and there-
fore claimed that the appearance of the hand was less relevant than the synchrony of the incoming multisensory 
information34,35. However, those studies did not compare the own hand with another hand, and the setup was 
not immersive (the images/videos of the participant’s hand were projected on a screen in front of her). It is also 
necessary to point out that, in general, we did not find differences in the sense of ownership between Congr and 
Incongr location of the hand/object. This might be due to the fact that, in this case, the Incongr location repre-
sented the position of the rubber hand in the typical RHI setting9, i.e., the hand was located in an anatomically 
plausible position and closer to the body midline than the real hand, and the distance between the hands was 
within the range that is considered suitable for inducing the illusion (e.g.,52,53). As in the RHI, such location 
allowed embodying the seen hand, and the strength of embodiment was similar to the Congr location. This fur-
ther suggests that the visuotactile integration during Synch stimulation overcomes the visuoproprioceptive con-
flict related to the location, as long as the location is anatomically plausible. On the other hand, it could depend 
on the effect of seeing the virtual body from a first-person perspective (1PP), which has been demonstrated to 
be a sufficient condition for eliciting the embodiment illusion24. Indeed, previous VR studies demonstrated that, 
during 1PP observation, illusory ownership is felt even in case of incongruent visuo-proprioceptive information 
(i.e. observing a virtual arm that performs a reach-to-grasp movement while the participant’s real limb remains 
still24,29,30,54).
As for the proprioceptive drift, no drift was present in any of the Congr conditions (when the location of the 
virtual object corresponded with the location of the participant’s real hand) and no significant differences were 
observed between them. On the contrary, in Incongr conditions (when the virtual object was 20 cm closer to the 
body midline than the real hand), the drift was significantly higher for OH than for Obj after Syn stimulation; 
importantly, it was not different between Syn and Asyn stimulation within any of the Incogr conditions. The 
absence of proprioceptive drift in Congr conditions is to be expected, since there was no conflict between the 
location of the seen object and the felt real hand. In turn, in the Incongr conditions, the drift was always positive, 
i.e., the perceived location of the real hand shifted towards the observed virtual object. Furthermore, it did not dif-
fer between OH and FH, or between FH and Obj, despite the trend of being the highest for OH and lowest for Obj 
(both in Syn and Asyn conditions). In case of Incongr conditions, the absence of significant difference between 
Syn and Asyn stimulation of the OH and the FH contradicts the typical RHI pattern (e.g.,9,15,45,55). Such seemingly 
conflicting result for OH and FH might be explained by the difference between the RHI and the IVR setups. 
Indeed, as discussed in the introduction, it has been shown that, in the IVR, ownership can be evoked solely by 
seeing the virtual body/hand from 1PP, even without the corresponding tactile stimulation24,25,28–30, and the 1PP 
also allows maintaining the feeling of ownership after asynchronous stimulation56. In addition, in the IVR setup, 
unlike the RHI, the participants might not even be aware of the incongruence between the position of their real 
hand and the virtual hand that they see, again due to the stronger role of vision32. Therefore, vision might be given 
high enough weighting to overcome proprioception and tactile sensations even during asynchronous stimulation, 
thus evoking a similar proprioceptive drift after Syn and Asyn stimulation. As for Obj, the smallest drift and no 
differences between Syn and Asyn conditions were to be expected, since it was intended to be a control condition.
Furthermore, despite our predictions, the disownership questionnaire did not show any clear disownership of 
the participant’s real hand in any of the conditions. However, the feeling of disownership was relatively stronger 
in OH and FH conditions than in Obj, which is to be expected because the Obj served as a control condition. 
Interestingly, this pattern was comparable between Syn and Asyn stimulation for OH and FH, especially in 
Incongr location. This result might suggest that, similarly to the proprioceptive drift, the effect of asynchronous 
visuotactile stimulation could have been overcome by a strong dominance of visual information (as a conse-
quence of the virtual setup). In general, the lack of clear disownership is not surprising, since, quite often, studies 
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that measured subjective disownership of participant’s own hand with the same or similar questionnaire items 
(e.g.,10,11) reported barely positive, or even negative, ratings. This might be explained by the fact that disownership 
of the real hand is generally less vivid than ownership of the fake hand, as in the RHI/VHI the attention is focused 
primarily on the fake hand57. Alternatively, it could be partially due to the fully virtual setup of our experiment: 
the participants could have been always aware that the hand that they saw was virtual, even if they experienced 
strong ownership over it.
Finally, we found a positive correlation between the subjective level of virtual OH similarity to participant’s 
own real hand and the feeling of ownership of the virtual OH in Congr location after Asyn stimulation (rep-
resented by Q2). In other words, the more the participants recognized their own hand in its virtual 3D image 
before the experiment, the more they experienced ownership of the virtual OH in Congr location after Asyn 
stimulation. This further suggests that the appearance of the virtual OH, while not being the main component 
of the construction of body ownership, might contribute to it strongly enough to overcome, to some extent, the 
multisensory conflict of the Asyn stimulation. Such result contradicts the findings of Longo et al.58 that RHI was 
not affected by the similarity between the own hand and the rubber hand. However, the rubber hand in that study 
was never treated as a representation of participant’s own hand, while in our experiment, participants started the 
experimental tasks after acknowledging that they were seeing their “own” virtual hand.
Summarizing, all our results suggest that multisensory integration was enough to create the feeling of owner-
ship of a virtual FH (but not a virtual Obj). In the key conditions, when the virtual hand looked like the partici-
pant’s OH, the feeling of ownership was stronger than for the FH after Syn stimulation only for the component of 
ownership that was more related to the appearance, and only when the virtual OH was located congruently with 
the real hand. Apart from that, subjective ownership of OH and FH was comparable. Crucially, unlike the FH, 
ownership of the OH was present even after Asyn stimulation, and it was stronger when the appearance of the 
virtual OH was subjectively more similar to the real hand. The results obtained for the virtual FH are in line with 
the neurocognitive model of body ownership17: FH (but not a hand-sized virtual Obj) was embodied after syn-
chronous visuotactile stimulation, both in Congr and Incongr location, which corresponds with the previously 
described levels of the model, i.e., the FH was hand-shaped, placed in an anatomically plausible position and 
stimulated synchronously with the real hand. In case of OH, the embodiment was initially constructed through 
the same steps as for FH (i.e., anatomical plausibility and visuotactile synchrony), however, it is possible that an 
additional comparison – the one between the pre-existing body image59,60 and the detailed appearance of the 
virtual OH – took place after these steps. Such body-image-related component might not be relevant enough to 
create consistent differences between the embodied OH and FH even in incongruent location (at least, as meas-
ured by the proprioceptive drift and questionnaire), but it might account for the feeling of ownership of OH in the 
condition of visuotactile asynchrony. Importantly, it might constitute the main difference between owning one’s 
own body and embodying a fake body part. During the RHI, or its variations, the fake hand is embodied despite 
the mismatch between its appearance and the existing image of the real hand (e.g.,58). On the contrary, when it 
comes to one’s real body, the body image is a necessary component of bodily self-awareness60, and it might have a 
top-down effect on the multisensory integration related to the body (hence the positive ownership ratings in OH 
Asyn conditions).
To conclude, by directly comparing OH and FH, we showed that, while body ownership does primarily rely 
on the integration of temporally synchronous multisensory information, it also relies on the detailed appearance 
of the body (or a body part). Importantly, the IVR setup of the study, although providing the possibility to manip-
ulate virtual OH, does not address ownership of the real body. Therefore, future studies might focus on clarifying 
the possible differences in body ownership of one’s own body and a virtual own body.
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